The man who allegedly blew up the bus at the Bulgarian airport used American identification documents, was white, had long hair and looked like a typical tourist down to his baseball cap, shorts and sneakers. Click here to watch the video.

It appears that the man was actually a Swedish citizen named Mehdi Ghezali. The Times of Israel reports that Ghezali may have been held in Guantanamo (2002-2004) and unsuccessfully sought to enter Afghanistan in 2009.

Another example of the plentiful supply of terror operatives who can easily elude stereotyping... 

Scientific American released an excerpt yesterday from Permanent Emergency.  This excerpt gives you a behind the scenes look at the Register Traveler program saga, including its history and security vulnerabilities.  Additionally, as I've mentioned before, when I left office in 2009, TSA was on track to install AT x-rays to detect liquid explosives in US checkpoints by the fall of '09.  The 3-1-1 liquids rule should be a thing of the past.  European airports have already deployed AT systems that have been certified for liquid threat detection.  Read the excerpt below to learn how the Baggie could be a thing of the past.  

The following is an excerpt from Permanent Emergency: Inside the TSA and the Fight for the Future of American Security, by Kip Hawley and Nathan Means(Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

One day in 2007 Stephanie Rowe, who was in charge of the identity- based programs at TSA, including Registered Traveler, accompanied me to a meeting with Ted Olson, one of the most respected and powerful lawyers in the country. Stephanie, who normally poured her considerable energies into solving TSA’s mission challenges rather than political issues, had no idea who he was at the time, but one glance at the marble and dark wood accents in Olson’s downtown Washington office told her that she was definitely in one of the preeminent halls of DC power.

We sat down opposite Olson and his client, Steve Brill, the founder of the CourtTV cable channel and American Lawyer magazine. The subject of our meeting was Registered Traveler, a proposed public-private partnership that would allow frequent flyers to submit a background check and pay $100 to move more quickly through airport checkpoints. Brill was a major investor in the program, and while I had green-lighted the program in 2005, it had floundered as companies offering the service had done little other than take the money and let “members” cut to the front of security lines.

Before long, Olson became angry with me, believing I was stonewalling innovation and hiding behind the mantle of “security.” I’m used to taking some heat, and I knew that Steve had him torqued up in anticipation of what I would say, so out of respect for Olson, I took one for the team and listened unperturbed to Ted’s impassioned lambasting.

Stephanie, on the other hand, was outraged. I could feel the steam coming out of her ears as she fidgeted and rattled in the chair next to me. When she got home that night she went on a tirade to her husband, David, about the conversation. After she was done, David said, “You really don’t know who he is, do you?” He gently explained that she had just been in a meeting with the former US Solicitor General, the legal counsel to President Bush’s 2000 campaign, and, on a personal level, a man who had tragically lost his own wife on the American Airlines flight flown into the Pentagon on 9/11. Olson was also a close friend of Secretary Chertoff though he never used that relationship to put further pressure on us.

The idea that the TSA should segment passengers into higher- and lower-risk populations was not a bad concept—indeed, it was part of our original mandate. With 2 million people a day, the TSA could provide better security and quicker lines for everyone if a number of preapproved people went through an expedited security screening.

But it wasn’t until 2003, at the urging of then–secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge, that the TSA opened a Registered Traveler program office. Because the TSA leadership was too busy fighting fires, the agency decided to let the private sector figure out the details of Registered Traveler before coming back for approval. By the time I arrived in 2005, RT, as it was known, was concluding a successful technology pilot in DC, Minneapolis, and Orlando. A small population of frequent flyers had been issued biometric RT cards and, after verifying their identity at special card readers, were able to proceed to the front of the security line. Expectations were high. The promise of bypassing long queues and demeaning security treatment fired the imagination of the American frequent flyer.

In October 2005, after a few months on the job, I was invited to a congressional hearing on RT that offered a rare chance for the TSA to score a clear public-relations win and maybe gain a few fans, at least among frequent flyers. Unfortunately, there was a security issue. The so-called vetting for RT members was only an immigration status and terrorist screening database check. Meaning that if you weren’t an illegal alien or already on the FBI’s radar as a terror suspect, you were good to go. Under these criteria, the July 2005 London Underground bombers would all have been eligible for RT cards. So at the hearing I announced that the private sector had to work out a business model to both fund RT and add security value while not inconveniencing the general public and then come back to us for a security evaluation. Then I went back to work on other, more pressing issues.

Continue reading

I spoke today with CBS This Morning about using risk based security to improve checkpoint operations at our airports.  Here's a recap of our conversation: 

Hawley said the conversation between TSA and lawmakers has been ineffectual. "Mostly they're talking past each other," Hawley told Charlie Rose, "as TSA had positive programs like PreCheck. But then the Congressmen see every weekend in their district how angry the public is."

"Why are they talking past each other?" Rose asked.

"Well, I think it really boils down to the administration (being the White House and DHS) has got to decide whether they want to have John Pistole make some changes, or whether they want to stand behind him," Hawley said. "But right now they're leaving him hanging out by himself where he just marches up with his talking points and the congressmen attack him. I think that the administration should say to TSA, 'Get this fixed. Take the prohibited items, reduce it, get another way to do the pat-down, start listening to the people rather than talking past them.'"

Click on the video below to watch the full interview

It's been over a month since Permanent Emergency's release, and I’m happy to report that the conversations about risk-based airport security continue.

Recently, GovLop founder Steve Ressler's blog post “TSA Mission: Impossible? Insight From Former TSA Administrator Kip Hawley” was featured on Huffington Post. This post discussed a sit down podcast interview I had with Chris Dorobek a couple of weeks ago. During this interview, I had the opportunity to discuss more about using the complexity theory to manage risk. This includes slimming down the prohibited items list by removing things like sharp objects and safely allowing liquids over 3 ounces through the checkpoint. TSA’s mission is just as important as ever and terrorists aren’t backing down. To stop them from attacking our aviation system, unpredictability at the checkpoint is critical.

Also, in case you missed it, there was a review of Permanent Emergency in the Washington Post recently. Thanks to Karen Greenberg for not only reading it, but for taking the time to write her thoughts about the book down on paper (or in this case on the interwebs).

 

TSA, Under Fire, Wants to Upgrade Its Service

Despite Recent Mistakes, Agency's Head Says Training Programs, Checkpoint Changes Will Improve Process

          By SCOTT MCCARTNEY

 

As anyone who travels regularly knows, airport screening has had its share of blunders, embarrassments and controversy.

And the Transportation Security Administration is, once again, attempting to change that.

The 10-year-old agency has been under fire from Congress and the public for treating all travelers like potential terrorists, inconsistently applying complex rules at checkpoints and putting people in distressing situations. Amid emerging threats, the agency has lurched through new technologies, some of which didn't work out.

Training and supervision are factors, TSA Administrator John Pistole acknowledges, and he has put new programs in place to improve communications and even promote common sense. He also blames continued checkpoint problems on the sheer scale of checking 1.7 million people per day and the delicate nature of screening people, where agents are charged with the objective of finding underwear bombs on the bad guys without being offensive to the good ones.

Will problems keep happening? "I think there will continue to be incidents," Mr. Pistole said, "but as we move more to risk-based initiatives, we'll see fewer and fewer."

According to recent news accounts: A mother was told incorrectly she couldn't take an ice pack and empty bottles for breast milk through airport security. Two elderly women had to pull down their pants to show medical devices. A teenager was wrongly ordered to go through a body scanner with her insulin pump, even though the machine can, and did, damage the device. A 4-year-old girl became hysterical when an officer insisted on patting her down simply because she hugged her grandmother, who was awaiting a pat down.

 

There is a police blotter, too. A TSA screener was ticketed for hurling a cup of hot coffee at an airline pilot who asked a group of screeners to clean up their profanity-laced conversation. TSA screeners in Los Angeles, Buffalo, N.Y., and White Plains, N.Y., have been charged with helping people smuggle drugs through airport security checkpoints. And there have been multiple arrests around the country in which screeners were accused of lifting cash, computers and other valuables from passenger bags.

The TSA does routinely have its successes. Last week alone, officers found 30 loaded guns in passenger carry-on bags. There were seven drug busts as a result of imaging technology, with contraband hidden on bodies and in clothing. One passenger was caught with a tube of toothpaste in her groin area, placed there after officers told her she couldn't bring the tube through. Those kinds of episodes, TSA says, show the agency could find explosives just as it finds drugs and toothpaste.

The agency is responsible for enforcing complex rules as thousands of officers screen millions of passengers across 450 airports in the U.S. So mistakes are bound to happen, Mr. Pistole said.

"I'd like to say we can guarantee 100% security and 100% customer satisfaction and it's just not realistic," Mr. Pistole said. Though the agency strives for that, "I don't know any government agency or business that has 100% customer satisfaction."

 

Changes to improve checkpoint handling of travelers are coming. This weekend, relaxed screening of people 75 years old and up will go into effect nationwide. That means anyone born in 1937 or before will be able to keep on their shoes and light jackets, and some belts.

Mr. Pistole said many of the agency's 45,000 checkpoint screeners have rote procedures down but lack good communications skills for dealing with the public. So he's running all through a "tactical communications" course; 28,000 have completed it and the rest will finish by the end of summer.

A longtime veteran of the FBI, Mr. Pistole has also created an "academy" for TSA supervisors. It recently graduated its second class of about two dozen supervisors.

About 43% of its screening officers, who earn between $25,000 to $61,000 a year, not including extra pay for high-cost living areas, have some college education, TSA said. Its attrition rate fell to 7.2% of the workforce turning over in fiscal year ended Sept. 30, down from 18% seven years ago. More than half of the TSA workforce has been on the job more than five years.

 

Since taking over in July 2010, Mr. Pistole has moved TSA away from "one-size-fits-all'' screening, deploying new procedures to make things better for frequent travelers, children and now people 75 years or older. TSA's "PreCheck" program lets travelers who undergo background checks go through special screening lanes with their shoes on and liquids and laptops left inside carry-on bags. Mr. Pistole changed screening for children under 12 last fall so they could leave shoes on and avoid, in most cases, invasive pat downs.

Mr. Pistole said the agency runs criminal background checks on all hires, but arrests of officers have raised questions about continuous vetting and supervision of employees. He has cited those cases in town hall-style meetings with TSA staff as incidents that tarnish the reputation of everyone at the agency. "It does concern me," he said.

When the agency messes up, it will sometimes apologize. In March, the TSA apologized after an officer incorrectly told a nursing mother she either had to leave behind an ice pack and empty bottles for breast milk, or go fill them up with breast milk before flying. The officer involved also received retraining.

The agency also apologized after two women in their 80s complained of having to drop their pants to expose medical devices at New York's Kennedy International Airport in November. Again, JFK personnel received refresher training on screening passengers with disabilities or medical conditions.

But after a family complained about a pat down of a crying 4-year-old girl in Wichita, Kan., last month, TSA defended its officers, saying they followed procedures.

The girl ran up and hugged her grandmother, Lori Croft, while she awaited a pat down. Because they touched, TSA decided the girl had to be patted down as well. The girl became hysterical, and the family told the Associated Press that TSA officers began yelling at them, calling the crying girl an uncooperative suspect, and patted her down while she was held by her mother.

 

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304065704577422442131848340.html

 

 

 

 

 

FDL Book Salon Welcomes Kip Hawley,

Permanent Emergency: Inside the TSA and

the Fight for the Future of Security

 

Tweet   Host: Bruce Schneier

Sunday, May 20, 2012 1:05 pm Pacific time

 

Welcome Kip Hawley (KipHawley.com) and Bruce Schneier (Schneier on Security)

Permanent Emergency: Inside the TSA and the Fight for the Future of Security

Welcome to the Firedoglake Book Salon. For the next two hours, we’ll be talking to Kip Hawley. Hawley was the TSA administrator from mid 2005 to early 2009. He has a new book, Permanent Emergency: Inside the TSA and the Fight for the Future of American Security, that chronicles his time at the TSA. For most of us, the TSA is our only contact with the “war on terror,” and I’m sure we’ll have a lot of talk about

that.

I’m Bruce Schneier, and I’ll be your host. I’m a security technologist and author who has written extensively about airline security, terrorism, and security in general. Hawley and I have debated several times in the past, most notably in this Q&A from 2007 and in The Economist earlier this year. Hawley reviewed my latest book, Liars and Outliers, on his blog earlier this week.

I have just finished reading Permanent Emergency, and I learned a lot about the TSA and their approach to airport security — stuff I had never seen before. I can’t even begin to summarize it here; perhaps the best thing you can read to get up to speed on Hawley’s thinking is his op ed for The Wall Street Journal from last month. My commentary on it is here.

Please ask away. Probing is good. Challenging is good. We’re not the mainstream media and we’re not going to limit this to softball questions, but I’d like the conversation to remain civil. I have some questions prepared to get things started but we’re counting on you.

Okay, go!

138 Responses to “FDL Book Salon Welcomes Kip Hawley, Permanent Emergency:

Inside the TSA and the Fight for the Future of Security”

BevW May 20th, 2012 at 1:51 pm

1

Kip, Bruce, Welcome to the Lake.

Bruce, Thank you for Hosting today’s Book Salon.

Reply

Kip Hawley May 20th, 2012 at 1:52 pm

2

Thanks Bev and Bruce for hosting. Looking forward to the discussion! – Kip

Reply

BevW May 20th, 2012 at 1:56 pm

3

In response to Kip Hawley @ 2 (show text)

Hi Kip, thanks for being here today.

Reply

Bruce Schneier May 20th, 2012 at 2:02 pm

4

Kip, your book has the first coherent explanation of the liquid ban I have ever read. For the benefit of

those who have not read the book, can you explain 1) which liquid explosive you were concerned about,

2) why you were unwilling to allow a 12-oz. bottle of liquid through airport security but were willing to

allow four 3-oz. bottles plus an empty 12-oz. bottle, and 3) what was the security reason for the baggie?

Reply

Kip Hawley May 20th, 2012 at 2:02 pm

5

I appreciate your scheduling this around the Celtics-76ers game. With all respect to the “L” in FDL…

Reply

Kip Hawley May 20th, 2012 at 2:04 pm

6

In response to Bruce Schneier @ 4 (show text)

Hello Bruce – 1) highly concentrated liquid hydrogen peroxide with a sugar fuel and some other things. An

extremely powerful explosive.

…

Reply

BevW May 20th, 2012 at 2:06 pm

7

For our new readers/commenters:

You will have to refresh your browser to follow along.

PC = F5 key, MAC = Command+R keys

If you want to ask a question – just type it in this box.

If you are responding to a comment – use the Reply button under the number.

Reply

Kip Hawley May 20th, 2012 at 2:08 pm

8

2) Our labs found that the mixture was extremely finicky and that mixing it was not simple. Our

professional chemists in labs had difficulty making the bomb and found mixing to be problematic. AQ

valued bomb-makers and were not sending them out on suicide missions. The times they asked

operatives to do minimal bomb-making (Richard Reid & Abdulmutallab), they botched it. It was risk

management in the end. A possibility but remote in my opinion.

…

Reply

Synoia May 20th, 2012 at 2:08 pm

9

What’s the plan for Lithium batteries?

With a laptop battery one could blow a hole in the side of a plane with one, under the right simple

circumstances.

A cell phone battery could cause a major fire.

Reply

Kip Hawley May 20th, 2012 at 2:09 pm

10

3) the baggie allowed the liquids to be gathered so officers would’y have to hunt for them and the vapor

lock captured hydrogen peroxide vapor for easy testing.

(end)

Reply

dakine01 May 20th, 2012 at 2:09 pm

11

Good afternoon Bruce and Kip and welcome to FDL this afternoon.

Kip, I have not read your book so forgive me if you answer this but why does so much of the effort by TSA

seem to be more Security Theater than actual steps that protect people?

Case in point, I spent most of 2002 traveling each between St Louis to Albany, NY and back. For 6 weeks

in a row, as I was leaving Albany on Friday afternoon, I would be pulled aside a the gate for extra

searches. I know TSA was trying to be ‘random’ but after the 4th week, the TSA folks were just shaking

their heads and recognizing that it was more theater seemingly than actual protection.

Is the show supposed to make us feel safer or feel better? If so, it isn’t working…

Reply

laurelei23 May 20th, 2012 at 2:10 pm

12

Hi, there are quite a percentage of people who cannot “read” body language, and most of them seem to

be TSA agents. Would think it should be one of the tests given to applicants, then enhanced with training.

Reply

Elliott May 20th, 2012 at 2:11 pm

13

Is air travel down because of all this?

It sounds soo unpleasant these days, I’d look for any other way to get to Point B.

(lol Rube)

Reply

Kip Hawley May 20th, 2012 at 2:11 pm

14

In response to Synoia @ 9 (show text)

Thanks Synoia — not speaking for the agency but we looked at lithium a lot and did not consider it a

threat to penetrate the hull. It could contribute to a bomb as an energy source but not as the main

explosive charge. Fire hazard is real which is why the FAA has rules on them.

(end)

Reply

Synoia May 20th, 2012 at 2:14 pm

15

In response to Kip Hawley @ 14 (show text)

What rules on laptop batteries? They do appear to be very high risk for malefactors.

Reply

Kip Hawley May 20th, 2012 at 2:14 pm

16

In response to laurelei23 @ 12 (show text)

Great question. The behavior observation specialists are selected from TSOs who have experience at

checkpoints and they recruit the ones who have the behavior skills. Actually TSA recruiting and testing

seeks to identify people who are good at pattern recognition. One challenge is getting people into the

right slots where their talents are put to best use. Still an on-going issue.

(end.)

Reply

Bruce Schneier May 20th, 2012 at 2:15 pm

17

As you remember, a lot of chemists dismissed the idea of an effective liquid bomb back when the ban was

imposed. I hope they’ll re-look at their analysis in light of what you’re now saying. Certainly I don’t have

the chemistry expertise to judge the veracity of your explanation.

What I really want to know is why an explanation took so long. Why didn’t the TSA explain the ban in

these simple terms back in August 2006? Why doesn’t the TSA explain it now? Why did it take you leaving

office and writing a book before anyone gave a clear explanation of the liquids ban?

Reply

Suzanne May 20th, 2012 at 2:16 pm

18

welcome to fdl kip and thanks for hosting bruce.

kip i found this book to be a particularly good read — and not what i expected. your writing was easy to

read and i learned a lot — both about the tsa and the fed response to disasters such as katrina. thank you

so very much for writing it and joining us today.

why did you want to write this book?

Reply

Kip Hawley May 20th, 2012 at 2:16 pm

19

In response to Synoia @ 15 (show text)

FAA has rules and this raises the key point about risk management. Is TSA there to stop malefactors who

could use lithium batteries or lighters to start a fire or should TSA be primarily concerned with things like

bombs that could have catastrophic results?

(end.)

Reply

emptywheel May 20th, 2012 at 2:17 pm

20

Kip

I haven’t had a chance to read you book yet. But one thing I’ve seen is the FBI use an attack in a sting–

such as an attack on the Metro–and then use that sting as an excuse to have TSA do random searches on

Metro and other subways.

This was under Pistole, not you. BUt it really seemed to be Pistole’s former agency setting up stings so as

to create teh need to police a resource.

What was the relationship between FBI and TSA–and do you have any idae whether it has changed under

Pistole?

Reply

Dearie May 20th, 2012 at 2:17 pm

21

How much formal education is required prior to allowing an agent to feel up a grandmother at a small (5

gates or less) regional airport? And what is the average hourly rate for newly hired TSA ‘agents’?

Reply

Bruce Schneier May 20th, 2012 at 2:18 pm

22

In response to Elliott @ 13 (show text)

It’s hard to know how much air travel is down because of the TSA. We have a lot of anecdotal evidence

that some people are not flying because of the full-body scanners and enhanced pat downs. One study

concluded 500 additional people die in the U.S. each year because they decide to drive instead of fly.

Reply

Kip Hawley May 20th, 2012 at 2:21 pm

23

In response to Bruce Schneier @ 17 (show text)

Bruce, we tried to explain it in simple terms back in 2006 and since and I just plain failed to get it across.

One of the reasons I wrote the book was to try to answer the complicated questions like 3-1-1. It took 6

pages (159-165) and my co-writer Nathan Means really contributed a lot to making it understandable.

Plus we had the actual scientist and explosives expert who were involved involved in the process (and are

also characters in the book).

(end.)

Reply

Dearie May 20th, 2012 at 2:21 pm

24

Is it true that the ban on cigarette lighters was dropped because it cost TSA too much to dispose of the

apprehended lighters rather because cigarette lighters are now ‘safe’ in the air?

Reply

dakine01 May 20th, 2012 at 2:22 pm

25

In response to Bruce Schneier @ 22 (show text)

Yet traffic deaths are at record lows and miles driven are also lower

Reply

emptywheel May 20th, 2012 at 2:23 pm

26

Bruce

I had read your earlier debate with Kip.

I’m wondering–in addition to the liquids explosive, what else did you learn in the book. Anything you’d

say differently than you did in your earlier debate?

And did Kip’s explanation about the liquid explosives convince you?

Reply

Kip Hawley May 20th, 2012 at 2:24 pm

27

In response to Suzanne @ 18 (show text)

Further to why I wrote the book (in addition to help explain a lot of misconceptions), I had learned an

awful lot about TSA’s strengths and weaknesses and wanted to pass what I had learned off to the next

Administrator. As you know, it took a year and a half to get one so somewhere in there. I decided to ‘open

source’ my security thinking and share it with the crowd to maybe debate and resolve some of the big on-

going problems.

(end.)

Reply

Bruce Schneier May 20th, 2012 at 2:26 pm

28

In response to Kip Hawley @ 23 (show text)

“Bruce, we tried to explain it in simple terms back in 2006….”

I challenge you to find records of any such explanations.

The TSA was able to afford writers to make explanations understandable back in 2006. Especially since

the value to the TSA of explaining to people what is going on is enormous.

The TSA made the same mistake with full-body scanners in 2010. They classify any reports on the

machines’ efficacy, even of their safety. They refuse to explain why they’re necessary. They refuse to

justify the cost. I really don’t want to wait for Pistole’s post-TSA book before I read a clear six-page

explanation of what the TSA is thinking.

Reply

Kip Hawley May 20th, 2012 at 2:27 pm

29

In response to Dearie @ 24 (show text)

No, the lighters were a distraction for our officers whom I wanted focussed on bomb parts and a waste of

time.

I gave a tip of the hat to none other than our host when I announced it in 2007: “Taking lighters away is

security theater,” Mr. Hawley said. “It trivializes the security process.”

http://boingboing.net/2007/07/20/tsa-head-calls-light.html

(end.)

Reply

Kip Hawley May 20th, 2012 at 2:29 pm

30

In response to Dearie @ 21 (show text)

TSO’s have to have high school or equivalent and a new Officer makes about $27,000 or so. Not exactly

sure I am up to date on that but ballpark. The key is that the good ones have a career path and bonus

potential for high performance.

(end.)

Reply

Bruce Schneier May 20th, 2012 at 2:31 pm

31

In response to emptywheel @ 26 (show text)

I did learn a lot reading the book. I’m saving some of it for future questions; we still have 97 minutes left

in this discussion. Some of it, like the liquids ban justification, I don’t have the science to evaluate. And

some of it — with all due respects, Kip — I don’t know whether to believe or to write it off as an attempt

to rewrite history. The fact is that we have never had visibility into the TSA and their decision making

process. This is why they have no real credibility anymore when they say “trust us.”

Reply

Dearie May 20th, 2012 at 2:32 pm

32

Are ALL TSA agents given full and rigorous background checks before being allowed to do “enhanced pat

downs” (AKA: gropes, feel-ups)?

You can probably intuit that I flew recently and it was miserable. Matron Rached actually ‘felt up” my

braids….quite disconcerting….and this was after I’d already been herded through the porn machine……

Air travel used to be a luxury; now it is a humiliating and stupid experience. Thanks for that.

Reply

Bruce Schneier May 20th, 2012 at 2:32 pm

33

In response to Kip Hawley @ 29 (show text)

Don’t think I didn’t notice when you used the phrase “security theater.” That phrase is my best shot at

immortality.

Reply

Bruce Schneier May 20th, 2012 at 2:33 pm

34

In your Wall Street Journal essay, you said that the technology in existing x-ray machines is sufficient to

justify getting rid of the liquids ban:

Existing scanners could allow passengers to carry on any amount of liquid they want, so long as

they put it in the gray bins. The scanners have yet to be used in this way because of concern for

the large number of false alarms and delays that they could cause. When I left TSA in 2009, the

plan was to designate “liquid lanes” where waits might be longer but passengers could board

with snow globes, beauty products or booze. That plan is still sitting on someone’s desk.

Many of us were surprised; we knew about new technologies that could detect explosives in liquids, but

we had no idea currently deployed technology could do this as well. You book goes into this too, but can

you explain what you mean?

Reply

Kip Hawley May 20th, 2012 at 2:34 pm

35

In response to Bruce Schneier @ 28 (show text)

I will post on my blog later but quickly, here’s my 2008 blog post

http://blog.tsa.gov/2008/10/path-forward-on-liquids.html

and in 2006 at the time

http://www.tsa.gov/press/releases/2006/press_release_09252006.shtm

(end.)

Reply

emptywheel May 20th, 2012 at 2:35 pm

36

In response to Kip Hawley @ 30 (show text)

What is that career path?

Reply

Kip Hawley May 20th, 2012 at 2:35 pm

37

In response to Bruce Schneier @ 28 (show text)

and this

from September 2006

http://www.tsa.gov/press/happenings/kip_q&a_09252006.shtm

Reply

Kip Hawley May 20th, 2012 at 2:37 pm

38

In response to emptywheel @ 36 (show text)

Can move up supervisory ladder or go to Behavior Detection Officer, technical route in equipment

maintenance, Bomb Tech, Inspector, and Federal Air Marshal. One year when I was there, a former TSO

finished #1 in his class of Air Marshals.

(end.)

Reply

emptywheel May 20th, 2012 at 2:39 pm

39

Kip

I fly out of GRR now–so a small airport, with lots of recognizable frequent fliers.

We recently got backscatters (or maybe got forced to use them because of the latest UndieBomb Saudi

plot). It seemed like it took 3X the number of people to train people to use the machine, to get everything

including boarding pass out of the pocket, to watch the bags piling up on the other side, and the

communicate the clean scan. I feel like this was because it’s a small airport (that is, one person had to do

the “training” for just one line). But I wonder–is this normal in the roll-out of backscatters? Is it a possible

response to TSA’s discovery of problems with the backscatter scans?

Reply

Kip Hawley May 20th, 2012 at 2:41 pm

40

In response to Bruce Schneier @ 34 (show text)

Yes, I guess I am sensitive about the topic since I am the guy known as the person who foisted the baggie

on the public.

We were almost set to go at the end of 2008 to get rid of the baggie. We had installed brand new

technology at every airport and designated “liquid lanes” so that the public could put large liquids in the

gray bin and they would go through the scanner like your carry-on. Our scientists and some in the

industry had developed algorithms that were superb at finding threat liquids…

Reply

Bruce Schneier May 20th, 2012 at 2:43 pm

41

In response to Kip Hawley @ 37 (show text)

Yeah, I just read those three links. None of them say “liquid hydrogen peroxide with a sugar fuel.” None of

them talk about the skill differential between the bomb maker and the bomb carrier. None of them say

“vapor lock captured hydrogen peroxide vapor for easy testing.” Those links were all along the lines of

“trust us, we’re the TSA.” And it didn’t work.

Reply

Kip Hawley May 20th, 2012 at 2:44 pm

42

In response to Bruce Schneier @ 34 (show text)

… but they had high false positives. I was pushing to get the algorithm deployed as a software update

before leaving in January 2009. The clock ran out and then “things happened” that first repealed my

requirement that manufacturers share their test data. Then TSA got convinced that they should wait for a

“better machine” (versus just a software upgrade) that would allow detection of threat liquids inside the

bag.

My WSJ piece references that and says, “GET OUT THE SOFTWARE ALREADY AND LET PEOPLE CHOOSE!”

 (end.)

Reply

Dearie May 20th, 2012 at 2:45 pm

43

Full and rigorous background checks for ALL ‘agents’ who interact with the public?

Reply

Squekyshoes May 20th, 2012 at 2:48 pm

44

In response to Bruce Schneier @ 41 (show text)

Hah, so the bar for success now is predicting the future? And do you expect the TSA to write the bomb

recipe for al-qaeda? Maybe even go ingredient shopping for them? Get real, schneier.

Reply

Kip Hawley May 20th, 2012 at 2:49 pm

45

In response to Bruce Schneier @ 41 (show text)

Back then Bruce, a lot of that was either Classified or sensitive with colleagues in other countries. You

bring up a good point about the book. Quite a bit of the book describes things that used to be Classified.

I went to each security agency and worked with them to clear off on what I wanted to use. First time this

particular approach has been done. I have fully learned the lesson that “trust me, it’s secret” doesn’t work.

That’s why we did the Blog (then unedited my officialdom, unlike now where postings have to be cleared

up the political chain.)

I got the message on transparency but it was not universally loved within the government. (!)

(end.)

Reply

Bruce Schneier May 20th, 2012 at 2:52 pm

46

In response to Kip Hawley @ 45 (show text)

I assumed that you had to get the book cleared for publication. When you say “each security agency,”

which ones in particular? What what were the sorts of things — I presume you can only talk in generalities

here — that these agencies edited out of the book?

Reply

Kip Hawley May 20th, 2012 at 2:52 pm

47

In response to Dearie @ 43 (show text)

Background checks. Read Bruce’s Liars & Outliers (after you’ve read Permanent Emergency) and it will

cause you to think deeply about the nature of trust and how one establishes that one is trustworthy. Trust

is also a moving target because some people move in and out of being trustworthy and are trustworthy on

different things. Huge issue in security, not just at TSA. But to answer your question, yes – such as it is…

(end.)

Reply

tuezday May 20th, 2012 at 2:53 pm

48

In response to Squekyshoes @ 44 (show text)

It works for the FBI and CIA, why not the TSA.

Reply

Dearie May 20th, 2012 at 2:55 pm

49

Kip@47: Is that a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’? Full and rigorous background checks on ALL ‘agents’ who interact with

the public?

Perhaps I’m just still in a fume about being groped, but I do not understand your answer.

Reply

emptywheel May 20th, 2012 at 2:56 pm

50

In response to Kip Hawley @ 45 (show text)

I noted you didn’t answer my question about the FBI stings using things they rolled out as TSA targets a

few weeks later. Shall I assume that’s classified then? Which would suggest there’s something there.

It is crystal clear that FBI chose to “sting” a target w/a Metro attack just weeks before Pistole rolled out the

effort to do random searches on public transport.

Reply

Bruce Schneier May 20th, 2012 at 2:58 pm

51

In response to Dearie @ 49 (show text)

Kip, I believe that Dearie is specifically asking about background checks against sex-offender databases.

Not an unreasonable question, considering what they’re doing to travelers.

Reply

Kip Hawley May 20th, 2012 at 2:58 pm

52

In response to Bruce Schneier @ 46 (show text)

TSA, CIA, FBI, NSA, NCTC, ODNI specifically. Plus I consulted with friends abroad who had equities and

also other former officials, not to mention lawyers. It was a surprisingly positive process. I would say a

batting average of .750 with TSA since I pretty much knew what would fly with them and about .500 with

the others.

They flagged a lot of the operational detail and some things that personally identified current players but

we had a feisty debate and they backed off of some and I others. The level of detail in PE is truly amazing.

When I say that person X (identified in the book) made a call at y hour or entered a building at z time.

They are literally accurate. Only in places where I really had to did I change and tried to use an analogy to

give the reader the right feel.

(end.)

Reply

Bruce Schneier May 20th, 2012 at 3:00 pm

53

Sam Harris and I have been debating profiling. He thinks we should profile “Muslims, or anyone who looks

like he or she could conceivably be Muslim.” I argue that it would reduce security. Could you talk about

the TSA’s view of ethnic profiling at airports? I’m less interested in the political repercussions of the idea

and more of the security efficacy.

 

Reply

Kip Hawley May 20th, 2012 at 3:01 pm

54

In response to Dearie @ 49 (show text)

Sorry. YES.

(as currently defined and subject to the operational rules blah blah like Atlanta airport workers) My point

is that People who have had top security checks for real and who are trustworthy, sometimes change like

Afghanistan and Maj. Hassan, Robert Hanson, etc.

Reply

Dearie May 20th, 2012 at 3:01 pm

55

Amendment IV: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable

cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be sarched, and the

persons or things to be searched.

How quaint.

Reply

Bruce Schneier May 20th, 2012 at 3:04 pm

56

In response to Dearie @ 55 (show text)

Airport security checkpoints are a Constitution-free zone in many ways. Freedom of speech doesn’t work

very well there, either. (But, to be fair, the government isn’t demanding to quarter TSA agents in my home

— yet.)

Reply

Kip Hawley May 20th, 2012 at 3:05 pm

57

In response to Bruce Schneier @ 53 (show text)

Short and sweet.

Profiling on the basis of LOOKS is terrible security.

AQ has hundreds, literally, of agents selected specifically because they don’t look like young middle-

eastern men. Here’s one.

http://t2.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcTxtf9Q-hjOUZMdyowuQA-

Qpa_A7usrMjOKHMXJNJHmVNLQyhx2qA

(many more examples!)

(end.)

Reply

DWBartoo May 20th, 2012 at 3:05 pm

58

Kip, I am late to the party, however I hope that you might answer emptywheel’s question @ 20 regarding

the FBI.

DW

Reply

RevBev May 20th, 2012 at 3:06 pm

59

In response to Bruce Schneier @ 56 (show text)

Thanks for the candor….Is all this intrusion justified by the eternal war on terror? Do you foresee any

consideration of let-up?

Reply

Dearie May 20th, 2012 at 3:06 pm

60

Bruce@56; They just want to ‘quarter’ their agents in my bra. Otherwise, have a lovely trip, no tipping

allowed. And after another underpants bomber (if the story is true……you know, trust and all that), my

motto is “Fly Naked!”

Reply

DWBartoo May 20th, 2012 at 3:07 pm

61

In response to emptywheel @ 50 (show text)

Yes, your surmises appear correct, Marcy. Kip have you anything to add to this assessment?

DW

Reply

Kip Hawley May 20th, 2012 at 3:08 pm

62

In response to emptywheel @ 50 (show text)

Sorry I missed your point.The FBI arrests and TSA screening in mass transit are completely unrelated. The

mass transit issue is years old and is based on real intell. I don’t know anything about the example you

cite but there’s a big difference between law enforcement and intelligence, but I suspect you know that.

(end.)

Reply

Bruce Schneier May 20th, 2012 at 3:08 pm

63

In response to Kip Hawley @ 57 (show text)

Are you assuming this because we know that al Qaeda has tried to recruit terrorists that don’t fit the

profile? Or is the government actually tracking “hundreds, literally, of agents selected specifically because

they don’t look like young middle-eastern men” by name?

Reply

Kip Hawley May 20th, 2012 at 3:09 pm

64

In response to DWBartoo @ 58 (show text)

I think I just did. Come back at me if I didn’t. Thanks, k

Reply

Kip Hawley May 20th, 2012 at 3:11 pm

65

In response to RevBev @ 59 (show text)

My WSJ article should tell you that I think that we can go a long ways in backing off intrusions on the

public for security. I believe the threat is very real and we need to get the public back in support of smart

security. The intrusive pat-down should stop now.

(end.)

Reply

Bruce Schneier May 20th, 2012 at 3:12 pm

66

In response to RevBev @ 59 (show text)

I don’t believe it is. Terrorism is a risk, but it is hardly existential. That being said, I think it will take

another generation to undo the security excesses of the current one.

Reply

DWBartoo May 20th, 2012 at 3:13 pm

67

In response to Kip Hawley @ 62 (show text)

A big “difference”?

Do we actually “know” that, Kip?

Given the dreadful state of the Rule of Law in this nation, and whether you might like it or not, there is

considerable reason for skepticism and doubt.

Presumably that surprises you?

DW

Reply

Kip Hawley May 20th, 2012 at 3:17 pm

68

In response to Bruce Schneier @ 63 (show text)

We know this from ten years of intelligence work by many countries and agencies. Very very specific.

That’s why I used Zubair in my book as the quintessential western operative that you never heard of. (My

editor could fix that sentence.) AQ has trained hundreds of western operatives, including from North

America, of all ages, colors, genders, whatever — many of whom we know by real name, some only by

nick-name. Bryan Neal Vinas was one.

Long Island altar boy, Little Leaguer, captured in Pakistan. The real deal lots on him in the press and in PE.

(end.)

Reply

RevBev May 20th, 2012 at 3:19 pm

69

In response to Bruce Schneier @ 66 (show text)

That is very discouraging since we are generating more enemies by our actions of drones and aggression.

Is there any dialogue from security people that we may need less/fewer excesses if we mitigated our own

aggression?

Reply

Kip Hawley May 20th, 2012 at 3:19 pm

70

In response to DWBartoo @ 67 (show text)

No, doesn’t surprise me. It’s a real issue, bigger than TSA or FBI. This is what we should be talking about.

The checkpoint mess just concentrates us on the wrong issues. If we fix the checkpoint, I think more of

the real issues will emerge.

(end.)

Reply

Bruce Schneier May 20th, 2012 at 3:19 pm

71

The TSA was originally about airport security, but now we’re seeing it at ports, on trains, on subways, and

so on. Where does the TSA’s authority end? Is there anywhere they’re not allowed to set up security

checkpoints?

Reply

DWBartoo May 20th, 2012 at 3:20 pm

72

In response to Bruce Schneier @ 66 (show text)

Assuming that civil society is not already turned into a locked-down police state, and that our economic

system has not devolved into a neo-feudal form, you are likely correct Bruce. In the meantime, “endless”

war and the crack-down on dissent, even as we see in Chicago these last few days, the cry of “terrorism”

will ruin and destroy many lives … “national security” at the price of civil rights and individual justice is a

very poor bargain, indeed.

DW

Reply

Dearie May 20th, 2012 at 3:21 pm

73

Kip@70: would you be so kind as to suggest what some of the “real issues” might be and how we might

approach them?

Reply

DWBartoo May 20th, 2012 at 3:23 pm

74

In response to Kip Hawley @ 70 (show text)

Then, by all means, let us speak bluntly to the issue of trust and the concept of of actual reason and NOT

political expediencies.

What say you, Kip?

Shall we?

DW

Reply

Squekyshoes May 20th, 2012 at 3:25 pm

75

In response to DWBartoo @ 74 (show text)

I can’t think of a less blunt way to ask whatever he is asking.

Reply

tuezday May 20th, 2012 at 3:25 pm

76

Hi Bruce. I’ve been a fan of your writing for years. Just wish more people agreed with your common sense

approach to security.

With that I will go back to my corner as a cantankerous devil is sitting on my shoulder.

Reply

Kip Hawley May 20th, 2012 at 3:25 pm

77

In response to RevBev @ 69 (show text)

I’ll take just a small piece of that. Many have written about “soft power” in terms of using America’s

peaceful strength. I totally agree. Everybody agrees with that but it’s harder since I am not convinced that

we really know what converts so many young people to bin Laden-style extremism. Clearly we could do

better with soft power but what about all the westerners and Americans who convert? We must

understand this better. Yes, I agree that isolating various ethic, cultural, religious groups by blanket

security measures is about the worst thing we can do. I got in trouble with some at TSA when I trained

TSO’s on what the Haj is all about.

(end.)

Reply

JonPincus May 20th, 2012 at 3:27 pm

78

Kip and Bruce, thanks for the discussion. Curious about what you see as the prospects for change; and

how those of us who want change can best be advocating and organizing.

Reply

Bruce Schneier May 20th, 2012 at 3:27 pm

79

In response to tuezday @ 76 (show text)

I believe you can still go through airport security with a cantankerous shoulder devil, but you may have to

put him in a separate bin and send him through the x-ray machine.

Reply

Kip Hawley May 20th, 2012 at 3:27 pm

80

In response to Squekyshoes @ 75 (show text)

Hang on, let me think and answer another. We probably agree and I am just being dense. – k

Reply

emptywheel May 20th, 2012 at 3:27 pm

81

In response to Kip Hawley @ 62 (show text)

That’s impossible. Pistole said, “look at [I forget the name of the young Muslim arrested in a FBI-created

sting.” We need to patrol mass transportation.

You may be saying, “there has been evidence people wanted to attack mass transport for years.” But that

doesn’t explain why Pistole specifically cited an FBI-created sting, rather than that evidence (or even the

Zazi plot) as justification to Congress.

So perhaps my question is better framed, what push is there to tie specific surveillance to specific attacks,

even if the FBI created the plot laid out in the alleged attack? And is it done for Congress, or the public?

Reply

DWBartoo May 20th, 2012 at 3:29 pm

82

In response to Kip Hawley @ 77 (show text)

What do YOU think converts “so many young people to bin Laden-style extremism”?

Certainly they do NOT “hate us for our freedoms”.

What possible threat do you imagine that “we” pose to them?

DW

Reply

emptywheel May 20th, 2012 at 3:30 pm

83

In response to Bruce Schneier @ 66 (show text)

We won’t be able to afford that, though. So it won’t take another generation bc we’ll go broke first.

Failing to educate the next generation of engineers bc we had to pay for the latest Mike Chertoff

technology is not sustainable even one more generation.

Reply

Kip Hawley May 20th, 2012 at 3:31 pm

84

In response to Bruce Schneier @ 71 (show text)

On TSA authorities, here’s the scoop:

http://www.tsa.gov/assets/pdf/Aviation_and_Transportation_Security_Act_ATSA_Public_Law_107_1771.pdf

It says that TSA has authorities in all modes of transportation. TSA supplements local authorities at their

invitation in other modes. The communications lines are much better than ten years ago and intell is

shared widely and TSA doesn’t force itself into an area. The local authorities have figured out that TSA is a

budget-friendly partner because TSA picks up its own costs.

(end.)

Reply

Bruce Schneier May 20th, 2012 at 3:32 pm

85

Let’s talk about Sky Marshals. There is considerable analysis that concludes that the program is not worth

it. But in your book, you talk about how the Federal Air Marshal Service is about a lot more than sitting on

random airplanes waiting for hypothetical terrorists to jump up and go “boo.” Can you explain? Also, do

the pilots and flight attendants know when a Sky Marshal is aboard the plane and who he or she is?

Reply

Kip Hawley May 20th, 2012 at 3:33 pm

86

In response to emptywheel @ 81 (show text)

I can only speak to my experience — everything we did on specific threats originated with AQ or like

groups.

(end.)

Reply

DWBartoo May 20th, 2012 at 3:33 pm

87

In response to emptywheel @ 83 (show text)

BINGO!!!

We cannot afford the extreme excess of our present “security” hubris nor the “cost” of maintaining

military empire while bankrupting the future.

DW

Reply

Dearie May 20th, 2012 at 3:33 pm

88

Kip@84: ‘Scuse me! I think the American people pick up TSA costs. Jeez!

Reply

emptywheel May 20th, 2012 at 3:33 pm

89

In response to Kip Hawley @ 77 (show text)

Isn’t part of the problem that our country treats Muslim terrorists very differently from white terrorists?

Since we treat them so differently (maybe not at TSA, but certainly from a prosecutorial standpoint–FBI

even brags about how much longer the sentences are for foreign terrorists), we prevent ourselves from

assessing what makes someone embrace radical violence, regardless of the particular brand?

Reply

DWBartoo May 20th, 2012 at 3:35 pm

90

In response to Dearie @ 88 (show text)

Even so, Dearie.

;~DW

Reply

emptywheel May 20th, 2012 at 3:36 pm

91

In response to Kip Hawley @ 86 (show text)

So when pitching Congress on a new need to surveil, did you feel restricted by classification of other plots

and therefore pick a convenient (if inapt) face?

I guess part of what I’m trying to understand is whether these things are being sold to Congress or the

public in a certain way because of a perceived need to scare someone.

We know for a fact, for example, that the govt used the plots Abu Zubaydah “revealed” under torture for

years, even though there were surely real plots that resembled the ones he “revealed” in the midterm.

Why?

Reply

Nathan Aschbacher May 20th, 2012 at 3:36 pm

92

Now that all the people are piled up in a huge mass in line for security screening, what will be the next

step of restriction after some nut invariably gets into the middle of them and blows himself up?

Perhaps a TSA agent on the residential doorstep of each traveller before they leave home, and a TSA

vehicle escort all the way to the gate of departure?

Reply

Kip Hawley May 20th, 2012 at 3:38 pm

93

In response to DWBartoo @ 74 (show text)

What I want to talk about is our security strategy. That is what Permanent Emergency is about. But there

are so many intertwined privacy issues relating to technology and government and or private entities that

have come up in the TSA context that I think that understanding what happened with TSA can be useful in

discussing the larger societal issues. What are the government roles, how do we use regulation and when?

What about our foreign partners, how to we work together? Hard for me to describe in web chat format.

But hopefully you get what I am saying.

(edit.)

Reply

Dearie May 20th, 2012 at 3:38 pm

94

I swear! I’m a pleasant old grandma, but I really wanted to say to Matron Rached at the small regional

airport, “I pay your freakin’ salary…..get your hands of my boobs!”

Reply

Kip Hawley May 20th, 2012 at 3:38 pm

95

In response to Dearie @ 88 (show text)

Point taken.

Reply

darms May 20th, 2012 at 3:41 pm

96

Two quickies for Kip and/or Bruce -

1)Is every commercial flight in the US using bag matching for every traveler? (i.e. every checked bag is

associated with someone who boarded the plane, I know they do this in Europe)

2)Is every bit of cargo destined for a commercial flight now inspected & X-rayed?

Reply

Nathan Aschbacher May 20th, 2012 at 3:41 pm

97

In response to Nathan Aschbacher @ 92 (show text)

Additionally, considering that more people die each month from simple influenza related issues than have

died as the result of travel-based terrorism in the last century, what do you think is a reasonable

proportion of government resources used to mitigate travel-based terrorism relative to government

resources used to fight the infection and consequences of the flu?

100:1 in favor of the much less dangerous risk of terrorism? 1000:1? Can you corroborate why the

significantly more benign threat of terrorism should receive such outsized attention relative to influenza

viruses?

Reply

Bruce Schneier May 20th, 2012 at 3:42 pm

98

In response to Nathan Aschbacher @ 92 (show text)

I hear this argument — that the terrorist can just below himself up at the TSA checkpoint — and I think

it’s a red herring. We can’t possibly prevent lone terrorist attacks everywhere 50 or more people come

together in close proximity. That would include restaurants, shopping malls, movie theaters, dance clubs,

government offices, churches, sports stadiums, Apple stores after the release of a new iPhone, and on

and on and on. Sometimes we’ll get lucky and the results won’t be so bad. Sometimes — like in Norway

last year — we’ll get spectacularly unlucky and the results will be horrific. Aside from investigation and

intelligence, and emergency response, there’s nothing we can do.

Reply

RevBev May 20th, 2012 at 3:42 pm

99

In response to Kip Hawley @ 93 (show text)

I think we are trying to figure out if anyone else is getting it. The invasive, scary stuff seems ramped up

all the time….jars, shoes, feels….where is any push back? Modulation? Maybe we just aren’t hearing it,

but the public relations stuff has been a disaster. Flights more miserable and more expensive. Do we need

to be scared to death?

Reply

Kip Hawley May 20th, 2012 at 3:42 pm

100

In response to emptywheel @ 91 (show text)

An example of a real issue to discuss. It may surprise you that the real government people involved in

surveillance are extremely conservative about staying within the bounds. They are not going to risk their

careers for some overzealous higher up who wants a headline. My experience was that the intelligence

that came in was carefully documented where it came from and that there was obsessive attention to

staying clear of the gray areas. This may be a case where the rhetoric on both sides swirls above a reality

that isn’t as good/bad as the debaters think.

(end.)

Reply

Bruce Schneier May 20th, 2012 at 3:44 pm

101

In response to emptywheel @ 89 (show text)

Yes, that is very much part of the problem.

I have always thought that the “war on terror” metaphor was actively harmful to security because it raised

the terrorists to the level of equal combatant. In a war, there are sides, and there is winning. I much prefer

the crime metaphor. There are no opposing sides in crime; there are the few criminals and the rest of us.

There criminals don’t “win.” Maybe they get away with it for a while, but eventually they’re caught.

“Us vs. them” thinking has two basic costs. One, it establishes that world-view in the minds of “us”: the

non-profiled. We saw this after 9/11, in the assaults and discriminations against innocent Americans who

happened to be Muslim. And two, it establishes the same world-view in the minds of “them”: Muslims.

This increases anti-American sentiment among Muslims. This reduces our security, less because it creates

terrorists — although I’m sure it is one of the things that pushes a marginal terrorist over the line — and

more that a higher anti-American sentiment in the Arab world is a more fertile ground for terrorist groups

to recruit and operate. Making sure the Muslim majority is part of the “us” fighting terror, just like we’re

all together fighting crime, is a security benefit.

Reply

Dearie May 20th, 2012 at 3:44 pm

102

Nathan@97: Excellent question. And, to be trite, follow the money. Believe me, it isn’t the GED level

‘agent’ who is getting rich off the terror-terror-terror flap nor off the machines that are to keep us ever

so safe.

Reply

Kip Hawley May 20th, 2012 at 3:45 pm

103

In response to RevBev @ 99 (show text)

Please check out my WSJ piece. If we did the things I recommend there, it would take a lot of the distrust

away without hurting security.

(end.)

Reply

DWBartoo May 20th, 2012 at 3:45 pm

104

In response to Kip Hawley @ 93 (show text)

“Permanent Emergency”.

Consider those words, Kip.

That vests the executive with “endless” power and, very often, make the people the “enemies” of the

state>

It allows Congress to consider permitting propaganda to be used on the American public, it allows fear to

become the instrument of first resort.

It allows the nation to be LIED into a war.

And, it is also a lie, there IS no permanent emergency, simply an opportunity for power to expand.

And that, Kip, is how many of us see “security strategy”.

In all of its splendor.

Have to leave now, but it has been …interesting. Many thanks to all.

DW

Reply

CTuttle May 20th, 2012 at 3:45 pm

105

Is this really necessary…? Cameras monitor every move in parts of Hampton Roads… For example…!

Reply

Bruce Schneier May 20th, 2012 at 3:46 pm

106

Kip, remember those incidents when TSA screeners found blocks of cheese with wires and such? I know

that cheese has the same density as plastic explosives, and is a plausible stand-in for a dry run to test the

efficacy of airport screening machines. I never heard the end of that story. How many cheese blocks were

found? Where? Was there a plausible explanation for the cheese-and-wire combinations? Were there

arrests? Was it all a hoax? To us sitting in no-explanations-from-the-TSA-land, it was all a bit surreal.

Reply

Nathan Aschbacher May 20th, 2012 at 3:47 pm

107

In response to Bruce Schneier @ 98 (show text)

Considering the number of airborne terrorist attacks, and the completely not invasive or annoying

measures to prevent them (ie. air marshals and locked-reinforced cabin doors) it seems pretty safe to say

that in security screening you’re not doing anything to prevent them either.

Furthermore all you did was dodge the question. It’s inevitable that such a thing will happen, and

considering how pointless most of what the TSA does to travelers already is, I cannot fathom how such an

event could happen and the TSA would just say, “Sorry folks, we can’t save you from everything. Just don’t

stand in big lines that we force you to stand in.”

What would be the next logical step to mitigate the incredible and existential thread of travel-based

terrorism?

Reply

Squekyshoes May 20th, 2012 at 3:48 pm

108

In response to Bruce Schneier @ 101 (show text)

Amen — best take-away from this chat.

Reply

Kip Hawley May 20th, 2012 at 3:50 pm

109

In response to darms @ 96 (show text)

Bag matching? — I think they are supposed to be but it’s another rule that with better scanners we could

retire.

International screening? — They just announced the answer to your question, earlier in the week and I

don’t know it. Net is that almost all of it is but there is no way 100% happens.

Check out this if you’d like a perspective on what threatens a plane and what doesn’t.

https://www.chds.us/coursefiles/cip/lectures/transportation/cip_underwearbomber/player.html

(end.)

Reply

Nathan Aschbacher May 20th, 2012 at 3:50 pm

110

In response to Dearie @ 102 (show text)

Thanks. It annoys me to no end that these discussions get mired in tactics and minutiae of

implementation when I don’t think the proponents of any of it have even come remotely close to

validating their very existence at all.

When you listen to them talk you’d think that 747′s were flying into skyscrapers every other Sunday and

twice on Tuesday.

Reply

Bruce Schneier May 20th, 2012 at 3:50 pm

111

In response to Nathan Aschbacher @ 107 (show text)

“What would be the next logical step to mitigate the incredible and existential thread of travel-based

terrorism?”

The same things that have worked in the past, and play to our strengths: investigation, intelligence, and

emergency response.

Reply

Kip Hawley May 20th, 2012 at 3:51 pm

112

In response to DWBartoo @ 104 (show text)

Thanks DW — the name Permanent Emergency is meant to say that we cannot sustain what we are

currently doing. I am not advocating for a PE. !

Reply

emptywheel May 20th, 2012 at 3:52 pm

113

In response to Kip Hawley @ 100 (show text)

There’s no two sides here, thanks. Pistole used an FBI created plot as his reason to roll out new

surveillance. That’s on the record, public, uncontested. It’s similar to the way the Admin ALWAYS uses the

alleged assassination attempt on the Saudi Ambassador–the location and weapon for which (and therefore

the outlines of the terrorist charges) were chosen by the government–in their efforts to drum up efforts

against Iran.

There is only a question of WHY he did that. You tell me the threat is real, goes back years. OK. So the

question I’m trying to ask–because the facts are not in dispute here–is why Pistole would use an FBI

created plot RATHER THAN refer to the real dangers going back years. And so I’m wondering if it’s

because of something about CONGRESS, or about the PUBLIC, in these new technologies?

In short, WHO needs to have a convenient, recent scary face–rather than a reference to classified

evidence–to be convinced these new technologies are needed? Congress? Or the public?

Reply

BevW May 20th, 2012 at 3:53 pm

114

As we come to the end of this great Book Salon discussion,

Kip, Thank you for stopping by the Lake and spending the afternoon with us discussing your new book

and your time with the TSA.

Bruce, Thank you very much for Hosting this Book Salon.

Everyone, if you would like more information:

Kip’s website (KipHawley.com) and book (Permanent Emergency)

Bruce’s website (Schneier on Security) and book (Liars and Outliers)

Thanks all, Have a great week.

If you want to contact the FDL Book Salon: FiredoglakeBookSalon@gmail.com

Reply

Bruce Schneier May 20th, 2012 at 3:53 pm

115

In response to Kip Hawley @ 112 (show text)

And, to be fair, the amount of editorial control a book author has over his title is close to nil. The point of

that title is to sell books.

Reply

emptywheel May 20th, 2012 at 3:54 pm

116

In response to DWBartoo @ 104 (show text)

Beyond the fact that we’re ignoring the far more real emergency, climate change.

Reply

Kip Hawley May 20th, 2012 at 3:55 pm

117

In response to Bruce Schneier @ 106 (show text)

Good question. There were real AQ plots and dry-runs using “stand-in” explosives like cheese. Since that

intell was highly Classified, we went through our domestic incident logs to find proxies for the real

probes. That allowed us to send it out to our workforce and train them on what we knew AQ was doing

but could use real examples (although the examples themselves were benign). The remote control toy

vehicle issue was the same. Our workforce knew the subtext but obviously not the press and it made a big

flap. No we didn’t have a war on cheese.

http://www.tsa.gov/press/happenings/remote_control_vehicles.shtm

Reply

JonPincus May 20th, 2012 at 3:57 pm

118&